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TEACHER COMPETENCY TESTING AND
MERIT PAY PROPOSALS UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND
TITLE VII
ELIZABETH M. BAGDON *
I. INTRODUCTION
The decline in educational achievement among students in public
elementary and secondary schools has caused great concern in this
country.' This concern has focused to a great extent on teacher com-
petency.2 In general, students who intend to become teachers do not
usually excel while in school.' Furthermore, many talented students
are uninterested in teaching careers because the pay and job satisfac-
tion are low. Low pay and lack of job satisfaction also have caused
* B.A., George Washington University, 1981; J.D., Washington University, 1985.
I. See, e-g., Gallup, The 11th Annual Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitude Toward the
Public Schools, 61 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 33 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Education Secretary Asks Congress to Pledge Support for 'Great Teach-
ing Profession,' CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Dec. 14, 1983, at 19, col. 1; Newport, Let's
Admit We Can't Train Teachers--and Ask for Help, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 102
(1983).
3. In 1970, students intending to major in education ranked in the top one-third of
those taking the English section of the college boards; in 1976 they placed in the lowest
third. E. GOODMAN, AT LARGE 233 (1979). Recently, students admitted to education
schools had combined verbal and mathematical Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores
17.5 points below the national average. Certification of Teachers Lacking Courses in
Education Stirs Battles in Several States, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 23, col. 3.
See generally Schlecter & Vance, Institutional Responses to the Quality/Quantity Issue
in Teacher Training, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 94 (1983) (discusses lower test scores and
grades of prospective teachers today and possible ways to combat this problem).
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many good teachers already in the profession to leave.4
Policy makers have suggested several ways to keep incompetent
teachers out of the profession, to persuade capable teachers to remain,
and to encourage some of the brightest students to enter teaching.5
This Note discusses two of the most common suggestions-teacher
competency testing and merit pay-and addresses potential legal chal-
lenges to these proposals under the equal protection clause 6 of the four-
teenth amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7
II. TEACHER COMPETENCY TESTING AND MERIT PAY PROPOSALS
A. Teacher Competency Testing
Several state statutes require prospective teachers to pass compe-
tency tests before the state certifies them as teachers.' The tests fall
into two categories: 1) basic skills tests, which measure either a pro-
spective teacher's expertise in English and mathematics or a prospec-
tive teacher's knowledge of basic teaching theory and methodology;9
and 2) specialty field examinations, which determine whether a teacher
is proficient in his or her specialty.10
4. See Newport, supra note 2, at 102; Aid Studied to Draw Best Students to Teach-
ing, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 11, 1984, at 19A, col. 2; Schlechter & Vance, Do
Academically Able Teachers Leave Education? The North Carolina Case, 63 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 106 (1981).
5. See infra note 14 for a discussion of methods other than competency testing or
merit pay for increasing the quality of teaching.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra note 31.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See infra note 101.
8. See, ag., ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-533 (Supp. 1983); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 44252 (Deering Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 231.17(2)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1983);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:7(6)(b) (West Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-3-2(9)
(Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-296 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-154
(West Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-110 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-110 (Supp. 1984); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.032(e) (Vernon Supp.
1982); VA. CODE § 22.1-298 (1984).
9. See, eg., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44252(b) (Deering Supp. 1984) (applicant for certi-
fication must demonstrate "proficiency in basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills
in the English language. . ."); MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-3-2(9) (Supp. 1983) (examina-
tion should determine "whether the candidate has the mastery of reading, writing and
mathematics skills a prospective school teacher reasonably should be expected to
achieve...").
10. See, eg., Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-3-2(9) (Supp. 1983). See also S.C. CODE ANN.
§ R43-63 (Law. Co-op 1976) (state administrative regulations require the prospective
teacher to pass the portion of the National Teacher Examination that tests his area of
specialization).
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Most states require that only those persons who initially apply for
certification after the effective date of the statute must take a basic
skills examination.11 Teachers already holding valid certificates are ex-
empt from this examination under "grandfather" clauses.12 None of
the statutes require that schools give hiring preference to teachers with
higher examination scores over teachers with lower, but passing,
scores.
B. Merit Pay Proposals
One of the most common suggestions for making teaching a more
attractive profession is merit pay, a plan by which state and local
school districts award outstanding teachers with higher compensa-
tion. California is the only state that has adopted a merit pay plan, 4
11. Pipho, Stateline: An End to the State Tax Revolt-Maybel, 65 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 309, 309 (1984).
12. "Grandfather clauses operate to exempt from the requirements of legislative
enactments certain defined individuals or entities that, at the time the requirements be-
come effective, meet specific defined criteria." Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Town-
ship Hosp., Inc., 86 N.J. 429, 440, 432 A.2d 36, 41 (1981). In Arkansas, practicing
teachers who did not pass the National Teacher Examination (NTE) between 1980 and
1983 must take a basic skills test. Pipho, supra note 11, at 310.
13. One of the other suggestions is raising the salaries paid to all teachers. For
example, the New Jersey Governor has recommended raising teachers' starting salaries
to $18,500 per year. Pipho, Stateline: Merit Pay/Master Teacher Plans Attract Atten-
tion in the States, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 165, 166 (1983). Former Secretary of Educa-
tion Terrel H. Bell proposed that states raise teachers' starting salaries to the same
levels as those of college graduates beginning business or engineering careers. Bell's 4
Goalsfor Education, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Dec. 14, 1983, at 19, col. 4.
Florida has established "a scholarship/loan program, a tuition reimbursement pro-
gram, and a loan forgiveness program" to encourage teachers to teach mathematics and
science and to teach in less popular locations, such as in inner-city and impoverished
rural areas. Pipho, Stateline: California and Florida Set the Pace for Educational Re-
form, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 85 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Pipho, Stateline: Califor-
nia].
Democratic Congressman Ron Wyden of Oregon introduced legislation to provide
scholarships to prospective teachers ranking in the top 10% of their classes. Aid Stud-
ied to Draw Best Students to Teaching, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 11, 1984, at 19A,
col. 2.
14. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44490-96 (Deering Supp. 1984).
A plan that on its face resembled a merit pay scheme existed in South Carolina be-
tween 1945 and 1968. South Carolina issued four classes of certificates (A, B, C, and D)
that reflected a teacher's score on the National Teacher Examination (NTE). The state
awarded class A certificates to those who scored in the top one-quarter on the NTE.
See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1101 (D.S.C. 1977), aft'd mer.
sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). One criterion
that the state used to set the level of its salary subsidies to a school district was the class
1985]
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but several other states, including Florida, New Jersey and Tennessee,
are seriously considering merit pay proposals.15
California's merit pay plan, the "California Mentor Teacher Pro-
gram,"1 6 allows the state school superintendent to authorize school
districts to designate up to five percent of their "certificated employ-
ees" 17 as mentor teachers. 18 The statute provides that the selection
committee 9 may nominate only tenured classroom teachers with sub-
stantial recent teaching experience and exemplary teaching skills.2"
of certificate held by each of the school district's teachers. This resulted in the state
paying higher subsidies to holders of higher ranking certificates. 445 F. Supp. at 1105.
While the state stopped issuing the four classes of certificates in 1969, id. at 1101, the
old certificates are still valid and the state still bases its salary subsidies upon them. Id.
at 1105 n. 10. Teachers may retake the examination to try to upgrade their certificates.
Id. at 1105 n.10.
Because the state bases its subsidies of teachers' salaries on the teachers' NTE scores,
which purport to measure their competence to teach, the program resembles a merit pay
plan. The scheme, however, differs from current merit pay proposals. The current state
proposals are to reward excellence. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44490 (Deering
Supp. 1984) ("It is the intent of the Legislature in the enactment of [the California
Mentor Teacher Program] to encourage teachers. . . to continue to pursue excellence
within their profession [and] to provide incentives to teachers of demonstrated ability
and expertise to remain in the public school system. . . ."). In United States v. South
Carolina, on the other hand, the district court characterized South Carolina's system as
promoting holders of B, C and D certificates merely to attain a class A level of mini-
mum competence. 445 F. Supp. at 1116.
15. See Pipho, supra note 13, at 165; Pipho, supra note 11, at 310.
16. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44490-96 (Deering Supp. 1984).
17. "Certificated employees" are persons holding certificates, credentials, or life di-
plomas, id. § 44006 (Deering 1978), including librarians, id. § 44868, social workers and
psychologists. Id. § 44874.
18. Id. § 44492(a). School districts with five to twenty certificated employees may
choose one classroom teacher to be a mentor teacher. Id. School districts with fewer
than five certificated employees may select one mentor teacher, but the state will pro-
vide the mentor with a lower stipend. Id. §§ 44492(b), 44494(a).
19. Certificated teachers must comprise a majority of the selection committee mem-
bers. The remaining members must be school administrators. Id. § 44495(a).
20. Id. § 44491. The section reads:
The [State Board of Education] rules and regulations shall specify that persons
seeking classification as a mentor teacher shall meet each of the following
qualifications:
(1) Is a credentialed classroom teacher with permanent status.
(2) Has substantial recent experience in classroom instruction.
(3) Has demonstrated exemplary teaching ability, as indicated by, among other
things, effective communication skills, subject matter knowledge, and mastery
of a range of teaching strategies necessary to meet the needs of pupils in differ-
ent contexts.
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The school district's board of governors has the power to approve or
disapprove the nomination.21 In addition to their regular salaries, men-
tor teachers receive a $4,000 yearly stipend for up to three years.22 The
mentors may request that the school district use this stipend to provide
them with "professional growth and release time."23 The state is to
provide funding for the stipends.24
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETENCY TESTING AND MERIT
PAY PROPOSALS
A. Equal Protection
By using tests and merit pay plans, states and communities create
classifications that treat persons differently.25 For example, a test di-
vides applicants into two classifications: one class composed of those
who pass the test and receive certification to teach and the other class
composed of those who fail the test and do not receive certification.26
States that have "grandfather clauses"27 create another classification
scheme: persons who already have certificates and may continue to
teach without passing an examination and persons applying for initial
certification.28 Merit pay plans also create two classes: one class com-
posed of teachers who receive the additional benefits and the other
class composed of all other teachers who continue to draw regular
21. Id. § 44495(d).
22. Id. §§ 44494(a), (c).
23. Id. § 44494(b).
24. Id. § 44492(a).
25. Sellers has stated:
Any law or official act that does not apply to all people invites a classification.
Inevitably, the benefits and burdens of the law are apportioned among those within
and without the class. Equal protection analysis is an evaluation of the legitimacy
of the differing treatment accorded by the law or act.
Sellers, The Impact of Intent on Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 84 DICK. L. REv. 363,
366 (1980).
26. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-533(A) (Supp. 1983) (to qualify for a
teaching certificate, an applicant must pass a proficiency examination). Not all testing
proposals, however, divide prospective teachers into two classes. A Missouri proposal
would penalize education programs if fewer than 70% of students in the programs
passed a competency examination, although students who failed the examination would
still be able to teach. Bill to Test Teachers Gets Bad Grade from Missouri Educators, St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 26, 1984, § C1 (News Analysis), col. 5.
27. See supra note 12.
28. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-3-2(9) (Supp. 1983).
19851
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salaries.29
Because of the unequal treatment of different persons, the classifica-
tions that the testing requirements and merit pay plans create are sub-
ject to scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution, which prohibits the states or their political subdivisions3"
from denying individuals equal protection under the law.31 To pass
muster under the equal protection clause, most classifications must be
merely rationally related to a legitimate state goal.32
Several classifications, however, require higher levels of scrutiny.
Legislation that classifies on its face by gender or results in a gender-
based classification must bear a substantial relation to an important
governmental objective.33 If a classification infringes upon a funda-
mental right34 or is explicitly racial, or if a legislative body intends to
discriminate on the basis of race, the classification must survive strict
scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny analysis the law must be "necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest or it will be deemed
29. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44492 (Deering Supp. 1984).
30. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968) ("[I]t is now beyond ques-
tion that a State's political subdivisions must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The actions of local government are the actions of the State.") (emphasis in original).
31. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states: "No state shall
. ..deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982) (Alaska dividend distribution
scheme that gives to adult residents a monetary payment based on one unit of oil in-
come per year of residency since 1959 violates equal protection because the state's inter-
est in maintaining its residents and assuring fiscal stability is not rationally related to the
classification between newer residents and residents in Alaska since 1959); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1980) (state statute that bans one type of
milk container is valid if state "could rationally have decided" that the law would foster
the use of environmentally desirable alternatives); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 (1961) ("the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective").
33. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives"). See also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
274 (1979) (to be subject to the Craig test facially neutral actions must be taken with
intent to discriminate on the basis of gender).
34. "Fundamental rights" are those individual rights that have their source, "ex-
plicitly or implicitly," in the Constitution. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982)
(public education not a fundamental right guaranteed by Constitution). See also San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) ("It is not the province
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws.").
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unconstitutional. ' 35
1. Tests
Several cases have addressed the validity of teacher competency tests
under the equal protection clause. In the early 1970s, two Fifth Circuit
decisions36 invalidated teacher competency tests on equal protection
grounds. In Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District,
37
the plaintiffs challenged a requirement that applicants for teaching po-
sitions and first-year teachers achieve a certain minimum score on the
National Teacher Examination (NTE) in order to be eligible for em-
ployment.38 The school district had made no attempt to validate39 the
test.' The requirement had a disproportionately heavy impact on
blacks.4" The requirement also had an unfair application because the
only two second-year teachers whom the school district required to
take the test were black.42 The court invalidated the requirement after
35. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Shapiro involved an infringe-
ment of a fundamental right, the right to interstate travel. Basically, the same test is
used to determine the constitutionality of overt or intentional racial discrimination.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("racial classifications. . . must be
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective").
While no set test has emerged, in practice the Supreme Court scrutinizes "benign" ra-
cial quotas somewhat less carefully. "Benign" classifications are classifications that ex-
ist to benefit certain minorities. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(minority business enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act that uses
racial and ethnic criteria to redress past discrimination valid means to achieve the objec-
tive); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304 (1978) (medical school ad-
missions policy to assist victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a
classification that imposes burdens on persons who are not responsible for the harm
suffered by the special beneficiaries of the admissions policy).
36. Baker v. Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972);
Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 1113.
39. An employer validates a test by showing that it is directly or indirectly related
to job performance. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250 (1976) (employer vali-
dated test sufficiently by a showing that test predicted performance in a job training
program) See also Booth & Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and
Evolying Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY L.J. 121, 159 (1980) ("A test that has been
shown to be 'job related' and therefore not in violation of Title VII is commonly re-
ferred to by the courts as having been validated.").
40 462 F.2d at 1114.
41. Only one of 18 incumbent black teachers whom the school district required to
take the test passed, while 64 of 73 white teachers passed the test. Id. at 1113.
42. Id. at 1114.
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applying strict scrutiny because of its racially disproportionate im-
pact.43 It also found purposeful discrimination in the adoption of the
requirement.44
In Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School District,45 the
court of appeals struck down the use of Graduate Record Examination
(GRE) scores in hiring and retention decisions. The school district re-
quired applicants and incumbent teachers to obtain either a given mini-
mum GRE score or a Master's Degree to qualify for initial or
continued employment." The school district made no attempt to vali-
date47 the GRE, a test designed to evaluate an individual's ability to
perform in a graduate program.48 Although the court upheld the
Master's Degree requirement,49 it struck down the GRE standard50 by
employing the rational relation test.5"
43. Id. See supra note 41.
44. Id. at 1115. See Walston v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492
F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974) (NTE not a valid criterion to measure competency because
there is no reasonably necessary connection evidenced by validation study between the
qualities tested and the actual requirements of the job to be performed), rev'g United
States v. Nansemond County School Bd., 351 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1972); Beazer v.
New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[P]ublic
entity. . . cannot bar persons from employment on the basis of criteria which have no
rational relation to the demands of the jobs to be performed."); Western Addition Com-
munity Org. v. Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Calif. 1973) ("All that the law re-
quires is that no minority job applicant. . . who is otherwise qualified. . . shall. . . be
excluded from that job by an employment test that goes beyond the actual requirements
of the job. .. ").
45. 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 277-78. The school district gave incumbent teachers two years to meet
the new requirements. Id. at 278.
47. See supra note 39.
48. 461 F.2d at 279.
49. Id. at 280.
50. Id. at 279. The court concluded:
It is unnecessary to decide whether there was a sufficient showing that the policy
did in fact create a racial classification . . . because the GRE score requirement
does not measure up to the equal protection requirements under the Fourteenth
Amendment, i.e., it is not reasonably related to the purpose for which it was
designed.
Id.
51. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See also Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d
1089, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 1975) (court determines that Georgia bar examination does not
discriminate against minorities because it satisfies two Armstead criteria that the exam
should be designed for intended purpose, and that the cutoff score related to the quality
that the exam purported to measure); Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
501 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1974) (if high school admissions test excludes dispropor-
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Even though the court in Armstead claimed to be applying the ra-
tional relation test,52 the court actually may have been using a higher
level of scrutiny. The court cited Reed v. Reed53 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird 54 as sources for the rational relation test,55 yet those cases now
are associated with more intense scrutiny than the traditional rational
relation test.56 The court's thorough examination of the test also ap-
tionate number of minority students, the standard it employs must substantially further
goal of improving quality of education) (citing Armstead); Georgia Ass'n of Educators,
Inc. v. Nix, 407 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (use of minimum NTE score as
one requirement for granting teaching certificate was arbitrary and not rationally re-
lated to purpose of certification).
52. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Baker and Armstead are of question-
able significance today. Baker's strict scrutiny of actions that affect blacks dispropor-
tionately is no longer valid because of the United States Supreme Court's 1976 decision
in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, persons applying
to become police officers challenged the District of Columbia's requirement that all
applicants pass a test as a prerequisite to admission into the police training program.
Id. at 232, 234. The test was to determine whether the applicant had sufficient commu-
nicative abilities to complete the training program successfully. Id. at 249. The effect of
the testing requirement was that it disqualified a disproportionate number of black ap-
plicants. Id. at 235.
The Supreme Court upheld the testing requirement because there was no showing
that the requirement discriminated purposefully against blacks. Id. at 246. The Court
stated that "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it
does not trigger the rule. . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." Id. at 242. The
Court criticized court of appeals decisions that viewed proof of discriminatory purpose
as unnecessary in determining a violation of equal protection. Id. at 245.
The Washington v. Davis Court held that challengers to a particular action must show
that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent before a court will apply strict scru-
tiny. Even under this standard, however, the result in Baker is the same because the
Baker court found discriminatory intent as well as discriminatory impact. See 462 F.2d
at 1115. But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (proof of discriminatory intent would not invalidate state
action if state could show that it would have acted the same way if it had not intended
to discriminate).
53. 404 U.S. 71(1971). In Reed, the plaintiff was challenging an Idaho statute man-
dating that males be given preference over females in choosing administrators of estates.
54. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). At issue was a Massachusetts law that barred the sale of
contraceptives to single persons but which permitted married individuals to obtain
them.
55. 461 F.2d at 279, 279 n.6.
56. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-96 (1977) (discusses Ei-
senstadt and other right of privacy cases); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976)
(discusses the higher level of scrutiny used by the Court in Reed). See also Gunther,
Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
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peared to be different from the deferential approach that courts usually
take in rational relation test cases. For example, the court was con-
cerned about the limitations of tests that measure classroom perform-
ance. 7 Under the rational relation standard, if the GRE measured a
skill that a teacher should have, such as verbal ability, a school district
rationally could conclude that it would be useful for making hiring
decisions. 8 One possible reason for this implicit use of a higher level
of scrutiny is that courts decided both Armstead and Baker before Con-
gress applied Title VII59 to the states.60 It may have appeared unfair to
the two courts to penalize private employers under Title VII for ac-
tions that had a discriminatory impact but no discriminatory intent,
while allowing government employers to disregard completely the dis-
criminatory impact on their decisions.61
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1972) (discusses the more intense scru-
tiny used by the Supreme Court in several cases, including Eisenstadt and Reed).
57. 461 F.2d at 280.
58. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). Castro was a pre-Washing-
ton v. Davis case that struck down a written test requirement for police force applicants
on equal protection grounds. The Castro court acknowledged that it used a higher level
of scrutiny than the rational relation test to invalidate the testing requirement, id. at
732-33, 736, and questioned another court's assertion that it merely had used the ra-
tional relation test to invalidate a similar requirement. Id. at 736, 736 n.14. The
Supreme Court later disapproved both Castro and the case that Castro questioned,
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 244-45 n.12 (1976).
See also Recent Cases, Teacher Qualifications-Use of Minimum Score on Standard-
ized Examination as Requirement for Hiring and Retention of Teachers Where Exami-
nations Not Reasonably Related to Purpose for Which it is Ostensibly Designed is
Impermissible as Violative of Equal Protection of the Laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 655 (1973) (discusses Armstead and the pre-Washington v.
Davis confusion about the proper standard that courts should apply in disproportionate
impact cases).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
60. By enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, §§ 2(2), (3), 86 Stat. 103 (1972), Congress in effect applied Title VII to state em-
ployees. See Recent Cases, supra note 58, at 659.
61. See Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
[O]nce discrimination has been found it would be analomous at best if a public
employer could stand back and require racial minorities to prove that its employ.
ment tests were inadequate at a time when this nation is demanding that private
employers in the same situation come forward and affirmatively demonstrate the
validity of such tests.
Id. at 1176.
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In United States v. South Carolina,6 2 a three-judge district court up-
held South Carolina's use of NTE scores to make certification decisions
and to determine teacher pay subsidies. Between 1957 and 1969, South
Carolina had issued four classes of certificates (A, B, C, and D) to
teachers who passed the NTE, with the state awarding class A certifi-
cates to the highest scorers and class D certificates to the lowest scor-
ers.63 Teachers could upgrade their certification by retaking the NTE
and receiving a higher score. 64 The state based its salary subsidies to
school districts partially upon the types of certificates the districts'
teachers held, with higher grades of certificates qualifying for higher
salary subsidies.65 At their discretion, school districts could supple-
ment the state's salary subsidies.66
In 1969 and 1976, the state raised the minimum score necessary to
pass the NTE and issued new types of certificates. 67 The state retained
its salary subsidy system and subsidized the holders of the new certifi-
cates at the class A rate. All certificates that the state issued before
1969 remained valid.6' The 1976 raise in standards followed a study
which found that the NTE was a viable measure of a teacher's mastery
of teacher training programs in South Carolina.
69
The plaintiffs challenged both the minimum score requirement and
the pay system on equal protection grounds by claiming that the sys-
tems discriminated against blacks.7" Although the systems had a sub-
62. 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd mem. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v.
South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
63. 445 F. Supp. at 1101. The state began using four classes of certificates in 1945,
but it did not require prospective teachers to obtain a minimum score to get a certificate.
The state used the applicant's percentile ranking on the test to determine which class of
certificate to issue a prospective teacher. Id.
64. See id. at 1101 ("[c]andidates are able to take the NTE an unlimited number of
times"); id. at 1106 (" Under this system, the Legislature provided to the holders of D
certificates the greatest monetary incentive for improvement of the grade of the
certificate.").
65. Id. at 1105.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1101-02. In 1969, the state decided to issue two classes of certificates:
warrants and professional certificates. The professional certificate required a higher
NTE score than the warrant. Id. at 1101. In 1976, the state again changed its certifica-
tion procedures. It began to issue only one type of certificate, but the minimum score
required for the certificate varied depending upon the applicant's teaching field. Id. at
1102, 1113.
68. Id. at 1106-07.
69. Id. at 1103-04.
70. Id. at 1097-99. The plaintiffs also claimed that the NTE violated Title VII, id.
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stantial discriminatory effect, 71 the court found no discriminatory
intent.72 In addition, the court held that the systems were rationally
and substantially related to several "clearly important ' 73 state goals of
promoting effective teaching in the public schools. 74
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed 71 the lower court's deci-
sion,76 over a dissent that focused on the plaintiff's Title VII claims.77
By its summary affirmance, the Court ruled that South Carolina did
not- violate the equal protection clause when it used the NTE to make
certification and pay subsidy decisions following a validation study.
Based on the above cases, a validated minimum competency test that
measures the content of teacher training programs will encounter no
equal protection problems. None of the testing requirements contain
overt racial classifications, nor do they infringe upon fundamental in-
terests.7s In order to attack these requirements on equal protection
at 1097, and the due process clause, id. at 1099 n.4. The court chose to treat the due
process claims "on the same basis" as the equal protection claims. Id.
71. The state had foreseen this discriminatory effect. Before the state began using
the NTE for certification and pay subsidy purposes, it had data indicating that the test
would have a discriminatory impact. Id. at 1102, 1105-06. Between 1945 and 1976, the
state received statistics from the Educational Testing Service showing the gap between
scores achieved by blacks and scores achieved by whites. Id. at 1102-03.
72. Id. at 1102.
73. Id. at 1108.
74. Id. at 1107-08. The court identified four purposes that the South Carolina certi-
fication requirements and pay scales served. These included:
[I]mproving the quality of public school teaching, certifying only those applicants
possessed of the minimum knowledge necessary to teach effectively, utilizing an
objective measure of applicants coming from widely disparate teacher training pro-
grams, and providing appropriate financial incentives for teachers to improve their
academic qualifications and thereby their ability to teach.
Id. at 1108.
75. Summary affirmances "are decisions on the merits, [but they] extend only to the
'precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.'" Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 499 (1981) (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S.
173, 176 (1977)). The Supreme Court's summary disposition of a case is binding on
lower federal courts. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Court,
however, is more willing to reconsider a decision made by summary affirmance. 453
U.S. at 500.
76. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978), affg South Car-
olina v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977).
77. See 434 U.S. at 1027-28 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent did not
question the district court's equal protection holding.
78. Cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). In Schware, the
Court stated that " [a] state can require high standards of qualification . . . before it
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grounds, a challenger would have to establish either that the state en-
acted these testing requirements with a racially discriminatory intent
causing them to fail under the strict scrutiny test, or that they were not
rationally related to a legitimate state goal.79
The difficulty of establishing a discriminatory intent80 is evident
from the history of South Carolina's testing requirement. It is unlikely
that anyone challenging a teacher competency test today will be able to
put forth any stronger proof of discriminatory intent than was present
in United States v. South Carolina."' South Carolina first considered
using a test to determine pay subsidies shortly after the Fourth Circuit
decided Alston v. School Board of Norfolk, 2 which held that the state
violated the equal protection clause by paying lower wages to black
teachers than to white teachers. South Carolina tightened its certifica-
tion standards shortly after the United States Supreme Court handed
admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection
with the applicant's fitness or ability to practice law." Id. at 239.
By requiring only that the state's standards be rationally related to its purpose, the
Court implicitly ruled that a person's interest in practicing law, and therefore presuma-
bly his interest in becoming a teacher, is not a fundamental one. If it were, restrictions
upon it would have to be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
79. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. If a plaintiff could show that a
state intended to discriminate through its test on the basis of gender, the classification it
created would have to be substantially related to an important governmental goal. See
supra note 33.
For cases that follow the South Carolina prescriptions, see, eg., Newman v. Crews,
651 F.2d 222, 224-25 (4th Cir. 1981) (state's denial of pay raise to grade B and C teach-
ers had disproportionate effect on minority instructors but is still valid under Title VII
and equal protection because it served legitimate state objectives of promoting teacher
competence); York v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 779, 786 (M.D. Ala.
1983) (for purposes of preliminary injunction, challengers to state's use of NTE scores
in making employment decisions showed a likelihood of success on the merits of a title
VII claim given evidence showing that two-thirds of those not rehired were black while
only one-third of school system was black). But see Craig v. County of Los Angeles,
626 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1980) (points out that Supreme Court in South Carolina
failed to recognize cases in which academic training is in the hands of the immediate
employer, making the qualifying test and program vulnerable to employer
manipulation).
80. See Sellers, supra note 25, at 372 (discusses difficulty of linking discriminatory
effects to discriminatory motives).
81. 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), affid mer. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v.
South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
82. 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940).
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down its landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education83 and the
state tightened them further after Green v. County School Board 84 re-
quired authorities to take affirmative steps to eliminate dual school sys-
tems. 5 The state made no effort to validate the test until the
Educational Testing Service threatened to stop sending NTE scores to
the state unless the state acted to validate the tests. 86 The state also
was aware of the disproportionate impact that its procedures had on
black teachers.87
In the past several years other states88 have instituted statewide tests
in an atmosphere of widespread concern over student achievement and
teacher competence.8 9 There is no indication that these enactments are
veiled attempts to exclude blacks from the teaching profession.9"
One method that states use to protect incumbent teachers is the so-
called "grandfather clause."91 Nearly all states92 use grandfather
clauses that allow incumbent teachers to retain their posts without hav-
ing to take competency tests. These clauses are virtually invulnerable
to constitutional attack. A plaintiff may be able to persuade a court to
use strict scrutiny in analyzing these grandfather clauses if they pre-
serve the effects of past discrimination against black applicants for
teaching positions.93 If a plaintiff's goal is to attack the grandfather
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school segregation deprives minority children of equal pro-
tection of the laws).
84. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
85. Id. at 437-39.
86. 445 F. Supp. at 1103-04.
87. Id. at 1101-03.
88. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-533 (Supp. 1983) (statute mandating
minimum competency tests became effective in 1981); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 13.032(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (statute mandating minimum competency tests en-
acted in 1981).
89. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
90. One example of legislative sensitivity to charges of bias exists in the California
Education Code. The state agency that administers the teacher specialty area examina-
tions must scrutinize these tests for cultural bias. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44295 (Deering
1978).
91. See supra note 12 (discussing grandfather clauses).
92. Only Arkansas requires incumbent teachers to take competency tests. See supra
notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
93. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1965) (failure to require
all voters to take new "citizenship test" was unconstitutional because it perpetuated
past unconstitutional discrimination against blacks in voting registration). Cf. Debra P.
v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 1981) (student competency test requirement
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clauses as a way to eliminate the tests entirely this approach may be
ineffective because the legislature could cure the discrimination by
abolishing the grandfather clause and requiring all teachers to take the
test. A grandfather clause would almost certainly be valid under the
rational relation test.94 On several occasions the Supreme Court has
upheld grandfather clauses by using the rational relation test.95 The
Court has justified these clauses on the theory that persons who already
practice in a profession are more likely to be competent than new en-
trants because of the former group's experience. 96  The Court's as-
sumption is tenuous. It is unlikely that the legislature would have
bothered to enact the new requirements if the persons already in the
profession were competent. State actions, however, need not be logical
to be constitutional,97 and a legislature is free to improve the state "one
step at a time.'' S Because of this leeway states have at their disposal
reasonable means to prevent additional incompetent teachers from en-
for high school graduation violates equal protection clause if it perpetuates the effects of
past discrimination).
In Debra P., the district court found, on remand, that "the present effects of past
school desegregation" did not cause the relatively high rate of failure among blacks.
564 F. Supp. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1983). If such a causal link did exist, the competency
test was necessary to remedy the effects of past segregation. Id. at 188. See generally
Benjes, Heubert & O'Brien, The Legality of Minimum Competency Test Programs
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 537 (1980)
(discussing the legality of student minimum competency tests). The article focuses on
Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1982), but a portion of the article assumes argu-
endo that the protection that Title VI provides is co-extensive with that of the equal
protection clause. Id. at 582-98.
94. For a discussion of the rational relation test, see supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text.
95. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-05 (1976) (per curiam); Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176-78 (1910).
96. See Watson, 218 U.S. at 177. The Court stated that "such exception [from the
competency requirement] proceeds upon the theory that those who have acceptably
followed the profession in the community for a period of years may be assumed to have
the qualifications which others are required to manifest as a result of an examination."
Id.
97. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). When Justice Douglas
stated that "'the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional," id., the Justice was referring to the constitutionality of the challenged
provision under the due process clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, rather than its
constitutionality under the equal protection clause. The requirements for satisfying the
rational relation test are the same under both clauses. See United States v. South Caro-
lina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 n.4 (D.S.C. 1977), afl'd mem. sub nom. National Educ.
Ass'n v South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
98. 348 U.S. at 489.
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tering the profession without removing those teachers who are already
in the profession.
2. Merit Pay
Equal protection concerns regarding merit pay plans are few. None
of the proposals contains an explicit racial classification. A party who
desires to place a proposal under the strict scrutiny standard faces the
difficult task of showing discriminatory intent in the formation of crite-
ria for selecting merit pay recipients.99 The selection criteria also
might be vulnerable if they are vague, or seemingly unrelated to teach-
ing performance. A party could then challenge the classification by
alleging that the classification is unrelated to the goals of the program,
and that it would be irrational to assume that the use of such vague or
irrelevant criteria likely would achieve the state's goal of rewarding the
most deserving teachers. 100 The success of this approach lacks a fore-
gone conclusion.
B. Title VII
Minimum competency tests and merit pay proposals are also vulner-
able under Title VII, °1 which prohibits employment discrimination.
99. To strike down a merit pay system, it would be insufficient for challengers to
show that the administrators of the system failed to follow the criteria and instead dis-
criminated against persons on the basis of race or sex. Such a showing would entitle a
plaintiff to relief against the offending official, but it would not be sufficient to abolish
the system unless the system itself provided that an appropriate official had discretion-
ary power to withhold or grant the merit pay. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
368 (1886) (ordinance gave officials total discretion in granting permits for wooden
laundries; court held imprisonment of ordinance violators unconstitutional).
100. Cf. Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 280 (5th
Cir. 1972) (use of GRE scores to select teachers was unconstitutional because it would
deny employment to some good teachers when there was no evidence that the GRE had
any relation to teacher competence).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Title VII states, in pertinent part:
2(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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Standardized tests often have a disproportionate impact upon minori-
ties." 2 In addition, merit pay proposals use subjective criteria that are
so difficult to measure that the proposals may mask an intent to
discriminate.' °3
1. Tests
Title VII generally prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of race or gender."° It specifically allows the use of "profession-
ally developed ability test[s]" if they are not "designed, intended or
used to discriminate."' ' In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,106 the Supreme
Court ruled that a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of em-
ployment discrimination by showing that an employment practice had
a discriminatory impact, even if the employer had no discriminatory
intent.'0 7 The burden shifts to the employer to show that the practice
"had a manifest relationship to the employment in question."' 0 8 In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,1°9 the Supreme Court added to the
Griggs test, stating that even if the employer showed that the ques-
tioned practice was job-related, a plaintiff could prevail if the plaintiff
proves that the employer could have used a less discriminatory
102. See generally White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Put-
ting Them on the Record, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 89 (1979).
103. Cf. EEOC v. H.S. Camp & Sons, 542 F. Supp. 411, 447 (M.D. Fla.'1982)
("promotion procedures which are based almost entirely upon the subjective judgment
and favorable recommendation of white male supervisors are a ready mechanism for
discrimination") (citing Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972)).
104. Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of color, religion or na-
tional origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). See supra note 102.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The section states in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to give and
to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin ...
Id.
106. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (black employees sue employer under Civil Rights Act
challenging requirement of high school graduation or passing exam grade).
107. See id. at 432 ("Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.") (emphasis in original). See also
Friedman, Congress, the Courm and Sex-Based Employment Discrimination in Higher
Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L. REV. 37, 44-45 (1981).
108. 401 U.S. at 432.
109. 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (minority class action suit for back pay to remedy past
discrimination by employer in making job decisions).
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alternative.'o
No uniform test exists for determining when an examination has a
discriminatory impact. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures..' use a "four-fifths" rule to find a discriminatory im-
pact."1 Under this rule a test has a discriminatory effect or impact if
less than eighty percent as many members of one group pass as an-
other.1 1 3 Courts and commentators alike are reluctant to apply the
rule. One court declined to use the rule and found no disproportionate
impact because the percentage of blacks selected for the jobs in ques-
tion was greater than the percentage of blacks in the surrounding com-
munity. 1 4  Furthermore, one commentator has criticized the "four-
fifths" rule by suggesting that disproportionate impact be determined
by asking whether the difference in hiring rates is statistically
significant.1
15
If challengers can establish that a test has a discriminatory impact,
the employer, to avoid being in violation of Title VII, must validate it
by showing that it relates to job performance. 1 6 The employer may
show either that it predicts or it relates to job performance (criterion-
related validity), that it measures the skills necessary for the job (con-
tent validity), or that it measures character traits that are necessary for
the job (construct validity)." 7 According to Washington v. Davis,''8
110. Id. at 425. See Friedman, supra note 107, at 44-45.
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1984).
112. Id. § 1607.4(D). The section reads:
D. Adverse impact and the "four-fifths rule." A selection rate for any race, sex,
or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate
for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal en-
forcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths
rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute
adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or
where a user's actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds
of race, sex, or ethnic group.
Id.
113. Id. See also Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Sta-
tistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793, 805 (1978).
114. See Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., 519 F. Supp. 211, 254-55 (,V.D. La. 1981), affd
per curiam, 702 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. Shoben, supra note 113, at 806.
116. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See supra note 39 for a
definition of validation.
117. Benjes, Heubert & O'Brien, supra note 93, at 6; Barrett, Is the Test Content-
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which addressed a statute similar to Title VII, 9 an employer may also
validate a test by showing that it measures skills necessary to complete
a training program successfully.120 Finally, according to United States
v. South Carolina,' an employer may validate a test by showing that
it measures an applicant's mastery of his training program, as long as
the employee concedes or the employer shows that the training pro-
gram is job-related.' 22 It is easier for an employer to validate a test
when the employer uses the test to establish whether an applicant has
the minimum skills necessary for the job, as opposed to when the em-
ployer uses the test purportedly to rank applicants according to their
suitability for the job. 123
The above principles have several important implications for the le-
gality of teacher competency testing proposals. To begin with, persons
who wish to challenge the tests can shift the burden of proof to the
examiners merely by showing discriminatory impact. 124 This makes
Title VII much more attractive for prospective plaintiffs to use than the
equal protection clause, which requires proof of discriminatory
intent. 125
Valid: Or, Does It Really Measure a Construct?, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 459, 459 (1980-
81); Booth & Mackay, supra note 39, at 162.
118. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119. The statute in Washington v. Davis was the Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(1) (1982). See 426 U.S. at 249 n.15. "[The defendants in Washington v. Da-
vis] appear not to have disputed that under the statutes and regulations governing their
conduct standards similar to those obtaining under Title VII had to be satisfied." Id. at
249.
120. 426 U.S. at 250-51.
121. 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), afl'd mem. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v.
South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
122. 445 F. Supp. at 1108, 1113.
123. See Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 822 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Martin v. Personnel Bd., 449 U.S. 1061 (1980).
124. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
125. Friedman, supra note 107, at 46. For a discussion of the need to prove dis-
criminatory intent and the difficulties in providing such proof, see supra notes 52 & 83.
A prospective teacher may have trouble suing the state under Title VII because it is
unclear if the state is an employer or an employment agency for Title VII purposes.
The Act defines "employer" as "a person. . .who has fifteen or more employees." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). It defines "employment agency" as a "person regularly un-
dertaking. . . to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees op-
portunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person." Id.
§ 2000e(c). It defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." Id.
§ 2000e(f).
In United States v. South Carolina, the district court declined to decide the issue
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Once the burden of proof shifts to the defendants, they must show
that the test is valid if they wish to continue using it.' 26 In light of
United States v. South Carolina, 2 7 it appears that a state may validate
its competency test by comparing the test's content to that of teacher
training programs in the state. 128 Theoretically, challengers could
claim that the teacher training programs are insufficiently job-related
to validate the tests. 129 Given its great deference to teacher education
requirements in other cases, 130 however, the Supreme Court is unlikely
to find such an argument persuasive. Moreover, this argument is likely
to be unpopular with teachers as well, who often contend that compe-
tency tests are unnecessary because requiring successful completion of
an approved educational program is sufficient to protect the state's in-
terests in certifying only competent teachers.
131
The holding in United States v. South Carolina does leave several
other avenues for Title VII challenges to competency programs. For
example, if the evaluators fail to follow the instructions for validating
the examination, challengers can attempt to show that this failure un-
because it ruled that the plaintiffs could not prevail even if the Court reached the state's
certification procedures under Title VII. 445 F. Supp. at 1109-10. A prospective
teacher clearly could sue to enjoin a local school board from using the examination
results in its hiring decisions, because under Title VII state laws that mandate or allow
discriminatory hiring procedures do not bind employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982).
See also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 940 (1980).
A prospective teacher who desires to sue the state directly to get injunctive relief
against the discriminatory effects of state testing policies may be able to sue under Title
VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), even if the state is not an employer for Title VII pur-
poses. Based on Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), at
least five members of the Supreme Court would approve injunctive relief under Title VI
for actions having a discriminatory effect as long as federal administrative regulations
that Title VI promulgated forbade practices having discriminatory impact. See id. at
3223, 3243, 3255 (use of impact standard); id. at 3230, 3244, 3251 (relief).
126. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
127. 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), affid mem. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v.
South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
128. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
129. In United States v. South Carolina, the plaintiffs failed to challenge the job-
relatedness of the teacher training program, and acknowledged instead that successful
completion of such a program was sufficient to insure that a teacher was competent.
445 F. Supp. at 1108.
130. See, e.g., Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979) (per
curiam) (upheld dismissal of tenured teacher who failed to obtain five semester hours of
college credits every three years).
131. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. at 1108.
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dermined the validation study's persuasiveness.132 This failure, how-
ever, will not automatically render the study inadequate. 133 The
challengers may also be able to attack a study such as the one in United
States v. South Carolina if a significant proportion of the state's teach-
ers studied out-of-state, in programs other than those included in the
validation study. 134
Persons attempting to attack competency testing requirements
should also prepare to offer less discriminatory alternatives that the
state could use to prevent certification of incompetent teachers. 135 One
commentator has suggested, for example, that essay examinations may
have less cultural bias rather than the traditional standardized multi-
ple-choice examination.136
2. Merit Pay
Attacking merit pay plans under Title VII is more difficult than at-
tacking competency tests. First of all, they may not have a racially or
sexually discriminatory impact. Even if they do, it will be difficult to
show that the criteria themselves, rather than an official's application
of the criteria, caused the discriminatory impact. 137 If states adopt
plans that allow certain types of teachers greater access to merit pay,
however, the plans could have a discriminatory impact. An example of
such a plan would be one that favored high school teachers over ele-
mentary school teachers. Because elementary school teachers are more
likely to be female,131 such a plan could have a disproportionate impact
upon women. The Governor of Florida has proposed one plan that
132. See id. at 1113-14.
133. Id. at 1114.
134. The South Carolina validation study involved representatives from every
teacher training program in the state. Id. at 1112.
135. The offering of less discriminatory alternatives would allow plaintiffs to compel
states to abandon the tests even if the state can justify their use. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
136. See White, supra note 102, at 116-17.
137. Presumably if the criteria were valid and the official's application of those cri-
teria were discriminatory, the criteria would stand while the official's decision would be
struck down.
138. In 1980. 75.4% of all elementary school teachers were female, while 56.5% of
high school teachers were female. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUR. OF THE CENSUS,
1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT: DETAILED OCCUPATION
OF THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BY SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
REGIONS: 1980 AND 1970 (1984).
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would award merit pay to teachers having students with the highest
achievement scores in a school.139 If a state adopted this plan, and
there is a showing that black teachers were more likely to teach in
predominantly black schools, the plan could have a discriminatory im-
pact because of the gap between the achievement scores of white and
black students.'"0
IV. CONCLUSION
Teacher competency testing and merit pay plans are popular reme-
dial proposals for this country's education woes. These solutions, how-
ever, carry their own set of problems. Poorly designed tests and merit
pay plans may be so arbitrary tlat they violate the equal protection
clause.141 Even somewhat less arbitrary examinations may run afoul of
Title VII.142 The key to avoiding constitutional and statutory
problems with the plans is to be aware of their weaknesses. States
should try to minimize the discriminatory effect of any tests they use.
This will help to lessen a perception that a state intended the tests to
discriminate against minorities. Minimized discriminatory effects will
make them less vulnerable to Title VII challenges, 143 especially if the
discrepancy between passing rates for minorities and non-minorities
does not run afoul of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's "four-fifths" rule.'" Similarly, merit pay plans should spell out
the criteria for awards as specifically as possible. Greater specificity
may help to eliminate the favoritism in the process and, perhaps more
importantly, may assist in eliminating the perception of favoritism.
Designers of merit pay plans should also be careful not to limit rewards
to certain types of teachers, such as high school teachers, if those types
of teachers are less likely to be women or members of minority
groups.145 By addressing the possible difficulties with these plans
before implementing them, a state would make these proposals more
fair, more effective, and more palatable for teachers to accept.
139. See Pipho, supra note 11, at 310.
140. See supra note 79.
141. See supra notes 25-100 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 101-31 and accompanying text.
143. See id.
144. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 138.
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